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Abstract 
 
In recent years, as electronic files include 
personal records and business activities, these files 
can be used as important evidences in a digital 
forensic investigation process. In general, the data 
that can be verified using its own application 
programs is largely used in the investigation of 
document files. However, in the case of the PDF file 
that has been largely used at the present time, 
certain data, which include the data before some 
modifications, exist in electronic document files 
unintentionally. Because such residual information 
may present the writing process of a file, it can be 
usefully used in a forensic viewpoint.  
This paper introduces why the residual 
information is stored inside the PDF file and 
explains a way to extract the information. In 
addition, we demonstrate the attributes of PDF files 
can be used to hide data.  
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1. Introduction 
 
People create their electronic documents using 
various application programs, such as Microsoft 
Office, Adobe Acrobat, and so on. Although the use 
of document files is widespread, few people 
recognize that ‘hidden’ data exist in files. The 
reason for using the word ‘hidden’ is that 
identification of these data is not possible using its 
own application program. 
J. Park et al. introduced ‘hidden’ data in MS 
PowerPoint files. Even after the contents of an MS 
PowerPoint file have been deleted or edited, they 
can still exist inside the file as residual information. 
This is because file-saving algorithm used in this 
application[2]. Similar to MS PowerPoint files, 
Adobe PDF (Portable Document Format) files can 
also contain ‘hidden’ data. Therefore, it is necessary 
to investigate such ‘hidden data’ in a digital forensic 
viewpoint. 
Adobe PDF files have been largely used for 
various purposes such as writing personal 
documents and distributing official documents at 
enterprise. In particular, for enterprise purposes, 
some confidential documents were created using 
applications like Microsoft Word or PowerPoint. 
And they were distributed after transforming into 
Adobe PDF files. In the past, PDF files were just 
application for distribution. However, the content of 
PDF files can be edited using various PDF editors 
in these days.  
The following is a hypothetical case related to 
Adobe PDF files. Company “Y” recruited new 
business partner for new technologies. As a result, 
both company “A” and company “B” were on the 
shortlist. The company “B” bought up a core 
member of the company “A” in order to modify 
final proposal and be business partner with 
company “Y”. Finally, the modified file was 
submitted, and company “B” was selected as a 
partner. Some three years later, certain suspicious 
elements were detected in the competitive selecting 
process, following which investigation of the 
business was undertaken. The only evidence was 
the Adobe PDF file created for the final proposal 
after long time. 
In the case, forensic examiners were able to 
investigate some evidences in Adobe PDF file. This 
is because the contents have been deleted or edited 
can exist as residual information inside the file due 
to the file-update mechanism. 
This study consists of seven sections. Section 2 
introduces the existing studies on Adobe PDF files. 
Section 3 describes the internal structure of Adobe 
PDF files. Section 4 represents the reason that PDF 
files can include residual information. Section 5 
proposes a way to extract the residual information. 
Section 6 describes a data hiding method using a 
PDF update mechanism. Finally, Section 7 
represents the conclusion of this study.  
 
 
2. Related studies 
In 2008, Didier and Matthew introduced that 
updated PDF files can include revision history by 
updating mechanism of Adobe PDF. That is, they 
explained it is possible to know revision history in a 
PDF file when the file is modified and saved using 
‘Save’ instead of ‘Save As’ function[1][5]. 
Didier was developed tools, such as pdf-
parser.py, pdfid.py for analysis of PDF files. The 
tools help examiners to identify an internal structure 
of PDF files. However, it is difficult to identify 
specific ASCII, Unicode text for digital forensic 
investigation[5]. 
Also, Matthew was developed a tool, pdfresurrect. 
The pdfresurrect shows the revision number and 
time of a PDF file. This tool makes investigators to 
confirm revision history. However, since it cannot 
verify what data is modified, there is a limit to 
utilizing in digital forensic purposes[1]. 
Furthermore, this study researches about unused 
area in PDF documents from the viewpoint of 
digital forensics. This paper introduces a tool for 
analyzing PDF files. It is developed with the special 
function of extracting text data(both ASCII and 
Unicode) at each revision. It is easy to compare 
modified version with original version. Therefore, 
the result of this paper is useful for investigating 
Adobe PDF files. Also, this paper explains that 
unused area in PDF files can be used for data 
hiding. 
 
 
3. Internal structure of PDF files 
 
As shown in Figure 1, a PDF file consists of 
Header, Body, Cross-reference table (hereinafter 
called xref), and Trailer[3]. 
 
Header
Body
Cross-reference 
table (xref)
Trailer
 
Figure 1. Basic Structure of PDF files 
 
The first line of a PDF file is header that has a 
version number. The trailer is at the end of a PDF 
file. It has byte offset of the last xref[3]. 
 
xref
106 22
0000000016 00000 n
0000001206 00000 n
0000001484 00000 n
...
0000000750 00000 n
106 0 obj
107 0 obj
108 0 obj
127 0 obj
 
Figure 2. Example of cross-reference table (xref) 
 
Xref contains information of all objects in a PDF 
file. The example of the xref is shown in Figure 2. 
There can be several xrefs, but Figure 2 shows only 
one of them. The term of “106 22” means that there 
exists twenty-two objects from the 106th object. 
Then, the first ten places in the next line represent 
the position of the 106th object as a byte offset. The 
second five places mean the generation number, and 
the value of ‘00000’ is allocated as it is first 
generated. For the third place, ‘n’ or ‘f’ can be 
positioned where ‘n’ is the object, which is being 
used, and ‘f’ is the object, which is not used (i.e., 
free)[3].  
Many objects exist in a PDF file. Objects are 
logically made of a tree. As shown in Figure 3, 
/Root, /Pages, /Kids, /Page and /Contents represents 
the type of objects.  
 
/Root
/Pages
/Kids
107 0 R
21 0 R
/Contents
1 0 R
6 0 R
108 0 R
3 0 R
/Contents
7 0 R
/Contents
116 0 R
/Page
/Page
/Page
 
  Figure 3. Internal structure of a PDF file 
 
Although there are various different types in 
addition to the type presented in Figure 3, this study 
refers the main types only. In Figure 3, the root of 
the internal structure tree is the /Root type. The 
/Root contains an indirect reference, “107 0 R”. In 
detail, xref in Figure 2 includes byte offset of “107 
0 obj”. /Pages type exists at byte offset 1206. 
Continuously, /Pages has indirect reference, “21 0 
R”. The “21 0 obj” is /Kids type, and it is possible 
to access the position of “21 0 obj” through proper 
xref. /Kids consists of one or more indirect /Page 
references. It is possible to know how many pages 
PDF file has. This is because a /Page type means 
each page inside a file. Figure 3 is an example of 
the PDF file that has three pages. In figure 3, the 
one of /Page types has indirect reference, “1 0 R”. 
The “1 0 obj” is /Contents type, and the position of 
it can be accessed using xref. Also, /Contents has 
indirect reference, “3 0 R”. The “3 0 obj” is the 
body of a page, and the data will be acquired 
through xref that saves the position as a byte offset. 
In addition, the body data can be a compressed(or 
encoded) format. Thus, it is necessary to 
decompress(or decode) the data in order to confirm 
plain text. 
 
 
4. Residual information in PDF files 
1) Update mechanism of PDF files 
Lots of users recently build their electronic 
documents using specific application programs like 
Microsoft Office 2007 and store them as PDF files 
through PDF transformation process. The Adobe 
Acrobat 8.0 was used in this experiment. Table 1 
shows the experiment procedure. 
 
Table 1. Experiment procedure 
Step1 
Create three-page contents (texts and 
images) using Microsoft Office Word 2007 
and store it as a PDF file using the function 
of “Save as Adobe PDF”.  
Step2 Open the PDF file using Adobe Acrobat.  
Step3 
Modify the content in the first and second 
pages of the original PDF file into different 
texts and images after deleting the existing 
them.  
Step4 
Resave it using the function of “Save” after 
completing the modification.  
 
106 0 obj
127 0 obj
126 0 obj
107 0 obj
108 0 obj
...
125 0 obj
1 0 obj
...
6 0 obj
...
23 0 obj
177 0 obj
1 0 obj
22 0 obj
23 0 obj
108 0 obj
...
%PDF-1.x
Original Block
Added Block
Page1
Page2
Page3
Page2
Page1
 
Figure 4. Structure after completing the experiment 
 
Figure 4 shows the internal format after finishing 
the experiment. Repeating Step 3 and Step 4 
attaches ‘added block’ to ‘original block’. “108 0 
obj” contains contents of the first page. “1 0 obj” 
has them of the second page and “6 0 obj includes 
them of the third page.  
Both “108 0 obj” and “1 0 obj” exist in ‘added 
block’, and “6 0 obj” doesn’t exist in ‘added block’. 
This is because the third page is not modified. As 
shown in Figure 5, it can be seen that the size of the 
modified file is bigger than the size of original one. 
 
Original PDF file Modified PDF file
File size:111KB File size:193KB
 
Figure 5. Comparison of original file size  
and modified file size 
 
Residual information is generated when the file is 
updated. Figure 4 and 5 show this feature. This 
feature improves the efficiency of saving a PDF file. 
In other words, it takes less time than a full save of 
the file. The reason for using ‘residual’ is that it 
cannot be identified by PDF application. However, 
if a user saves the file using the “Save As” function, 
the application does reconstruct the entire structure. 
 
2) Residual information in PDF files  
Figure 6 explains the concept of residual 
information. In Figure 6, the left side is xref of the 
modified file, and the right side is the internal 
structure. “108 0 obj” and “1 0 obj” exist in both 
original and added blocks. “108 0 obj” in ‘added 
block’ is appended after modifying the file. 
Therefore, “108 0 obj” in ‘original block’ exist in 
the file as the residual information. 
  
106 0 obj
127 0 obj
126 0 obj
107 0 obj
108 0 obj
...
125 0 obj
1 0 obj
...
6 0 obj
...
23 0 obj
177 0 obj
1 0 obj
22 0 obj
23 0 obj
108 0 obj
...
%PDF-1.x
Page1
Page2
Page3
Page2
Page1
xref
106 22
0000000016   00000 n
0000001206   00000 n
0000001484   00000 n
...
trailer
xref
0 106
0000000000   65535 f
0000053665   00000 n
...
0000093361   00000 n
...
0000000000   65535 f
trailer
xref
1 1
0000114777   00000 n
108 1
0000119465   00000 n
trailer
Original Block
Added Block
Not Referenced Object
Referenced Object
 
Figure 6. State of reference in modified file 
 
As the first and second pages are modified, the 
objects related to the modification are included in 
both ‘original block’ and ‘added block’. The first 
page after the modification does not use the 108th 
object in the ‘original block’ but use the 108th object 
in the ‘added block’. The 108th and the 1st objects in 
the ‘original block’ are not used by the PDF file 
viewer. 
Original file
size : 111KB
Modified file
size : 193KB
Recovered file
size : 193KB
 
5. Extraction of residual information 
1) Recovering the file to original version 
In figure 6, the first page of the PDF file after the 
modification uses the 108th object (byte offset 
119465) in the ‘added block’. Also, the second page 
uses the 1th object (byte offset 114777) in the 
‘added block’. 
In Figure 8, to access the contents of original file, 
there is one methodology that it changes byte offset 
114777 into byte offset 53665. In addition, it 
replaces byte offset 119465 with byte offset 1484. 
Then, the file is recovered to original version. Also, 
the contents of the original file can be viewed using 
a PDF file viewer.  
Figure 7 shows the contents identified by a PDF 
file viewer. It is verified that the size of the 
recovered file is the same as the modified file and 
shows the same contents as the original file. 
 
106 0 obj
127 0 obj
126 0 obj
107 0 obj
108 0 obj
...
125 0 obj
1 0 obj
...
6 0 obj
...
23 0 obj
177 0 obj
1 0 obj
22 0 obj
23 0 obj
108 0 obj
...
%PDF-1.x
Page1
Page2
Page3
Page2
Page1
xref
106 22
0000000016   00000 n
0000001206   00000 n
0000001484   00000 n
...
trailer
xref
0 106
0000000000   65535 f
0000053665   00000 n
...
0000093361   00000 n
...
0000000000   65535 f
trailer
xref
1 1
0000053665   00000 n
108 1
0000001484   00000 n
trailer
Original Block
Added Block
Not Referenced Object
Referenced Object
 
Figure 8. Method of recovering the file 
 
2) Extraction of texts and images 
Another method of extracting residual 
information is to directly extract text and images. 
Since the rules of storing text and images in PDF 
files are presented in [3], the contents can be 
extracted directly.  
Figure 7. Size and contents of original file, modified file, and recovered file 
Figure 9. ExPRI (Extractor for PDF Residual Information) 
In case of the text data, there are two types of 
ASCII and Unicode. The text data can be extracted 
by decompressing (or decoding) the data of a target 
object. Although decompressed (or decoded) data is 
acquired, it is difficult to extract exact text data. 
Since the PDF file saves the text with some 
information such as position, shape and so on, it is 
necessary to do additional parsing process. 
Also, the images in the content can be directly 
extracted because images are stored as their own 
image formats.  
 
 
3) ExPRI (Extractor for PDF Residual Information)  
To investigate the forensic attributes of Adobe 
PDF file, ExPRI(Extractor for PDF Residual 
Information) has been developed. It is difficult for 
investigator to change manually byte offset using 
methodology in Figure 8. 
The ExPRI is able to recovery previous files and 
to extract the text at each storing point. Left side in 
Figure 9 shows result of extracting modified PDF 
file’s contents. Right side in Figure 9 shows the 
result of extracting recovered PDF file’s contents. 
Modified and recovered file in Figure 7 demonstrate 
that ExPRI extracts text correctly. 
6. Data hiding method using file-update mechanism 
1) Data hiding technique 1 
The actually viewed section is the part of ‘valid 
data’ of the modified file presented in Figure 10. It 
means that although the area of ‘hidden data’ exists 
inside the file, it is not used. This area can be used 
to hide data. Even though ‘hidden data’ is stored in 
a PDF file, the data cannot be identified using a 
PDF file viewer. Since the data is compressed (or 
encoded), it is not possible to verify such data using 
a simple method like Strings. Therefore, it can be 
used as a method that simply hides huge amounts of 
data. 
106 0 obj
127 0 obj
126 0 obj
107 0 obj
108 0 obj
...
125 0 obj
1 0 obj
...
6 0 obj
...
23 0 obj
177 0 obj
1 0 obj
22 0 obj
23 0 obj
108 0 obj
...
%PDF-1.x
Page1
Page2
Page3
Page2
Page1
Hidden data
Valid data
Original file
size : 111KB
Modified file
size : 193KB
106 0 obj
127 0 obj
126 0 obj
107 0 obj
108 0 obj
...
125 0 obj
1 0 obj
...
6 0 obj
...
23 0 obj
%PDF-1.x
Page1
Page2
Page3
 
Figure 10. Hidden and valid data in the modified file 
 
2) Data hiding technique 2 
Because the area of ‘hidden data’ presented in 
Figure 10 is not used, the area can be used for 
hiding the data. Figure 11 illustrates the example of 
such a way. As the data is hidden using this method, 
it is not possible to verify the data by extracting the 
residual information. Also, it is very strong way to 
hide data with encryption algorithms. Thus, it is 
very difficult to investigate such hidden data.  
 
Intentionally Hidden Data
Data Hiding
 
Figure 11. Data hiding technique 2 
 
These two methods presented above represent an 
advantage that is able to hide huge amounts of data 
compared with the method proposed by Shangping 
Zhong et al. [4]. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In digital forensic investigation, there are some 
cases which documents files are analyzed as 
evidences. Because researches on electronic 
document forensics are not enough until now, the 
analyses have been focused on the contents that can 
be easily verified by using specific applications. 
However, this method is insufficient for analyzing 
PDF files because there are ‘hidden data’ inside 
them. In this vein, it is expected that the method 
introduced in this study is useful to investigate 
Adobe PDF files. Also, this study will help to 
improve the admissibility of electronic documentary 
evidence. 
In this study, we analyzed the structure and 
attributes of Adobe PDF files in a digital forensic 
viewpoint. It is possible to trace the previous work 
in a file using its residual information remained in 
the file based on the update mechanism of an Adobe 
PDF editing program. In addition, because the area 
of residual information is not identified by a PDF 
file viewer, it can be used as a way of data hiding.  
For future study, the tool that has been developed 
at the present time will be completed. It can be used 
as a forensic analysis module for PDF files because 
it includes previous file recovery, text and image 
extraction, and metadata extraction functions for 
each storing point. In addition, a study on the 
method that intentionally hides data to the unused 
area where residual information are stored will be 
deeply conducted. 
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